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CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY & RISK MANAGEMENT: AN INVESTIGATION 
OF REINSURANCE & CHARITABLE GIVING IN INSURANCE FIRMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In this study we examine the empirical relation between corporate charitable 
donations – a significant item of discretionary strategic spending (McKinsey, 2015), and 
reinsurance (i.e., 'insurance for insurers') in the United Kingdom's (UK) non-life (property-
casualty) insurance industry. In doing so, we build on a growing body of research that 
focuses on the strategic insurance role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities 
(e.g., Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen, 2009; Godfrey, Hatch & Hansen, 2010). 
More recent research in this field (e.g., den Hond, Rehbein, Bakker & Lankveld, 2014; Jia, 
2014; Marquis & Qian, 2014) points to potential substitution effects and complementarities 
between CSR and the risk management benefits of corporate political activities. Such 'CSR-
as-insurance' studies are predicated, at least implicitly, on the strategic stakeholder notion 
that a firm's long-term financial success is dependent on the confidence that stakeholders 
have in the integrity and ethicality of its business practices. Further,  research suggests that 
CSR investment builds insurance protection in the form of positive 'moral capital' and 
protects firm value following a major negative event (e.g., a major governance failure) by 
appeasing key constituent interests (Jo & Na, 2012). Chiu & Sharfman (2011) add that 'CSR-
as-insurance' increases a firm's legitimacy with stakeholders and enables it to realize 
sustainable competitive advantages over market rivals. However, prior studies have not 
examined empirically the strategic tensions that can arise between CSR-type activities (such 
as charitable giving) and other discretionary (especially financial-type) risk management 
activities in firms. In our view, this is an important omission given that firms across all 
industries habitually engage to a greater or lesser extent in both CSR-type investments and 
the use of risk transfer mechanisms such as commercial insurance. 
The present study contributes to the management literature by examining the 
substitutive/complementary relation between charitable giving and reinsurance - a risk 
hedging mechanism that is routinely purchased by insurers in order to protect the contractual 
and transactional interests of stakeholders (e.g., investors, policyholders, and regulators) 
against bankruptcy and other financial risks (Abdul Kader, Adams & Mouritidis, 2010). In 
setting ourselves this goal, we also directly respond to Koh, Qian & Wang's (2014) recent 
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call for scholars to investigate the connectivity between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and other risk mitigation mechanisms used by firms. The notion that the practice of corporate 
risk management involves managers selecting from a 'menu' of hedging options is well-
recognized in the finance literature (e.g., Rochet & Villeneuve, 2011). However, theoretical 
and empirical research on the inter-relation between different risk mitigation strategies, 
including CSR activities, is still relatively undeveloped. The present study thus seeks to 
address this gap in the literature and advance understanding of the linkages between 'CSR-as-
insurance' and conventional risk management techniques such as the corporate purchase of  
(re)insurance. Our study also sheds light on why certain firms are more philanthropic than 
others - an empirical issue of interest to multiple stakeholders, including market investors, 
customers, industry regulators, and the general public. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give 
background information on the UK’s non-life insurance industry, and introduce the strategic 
stakeholder functions of reinsurance and philanthropy. The third section puts forward our 
two main alternate paired-hypotheses, and explains the moderating-effects of board 
composition. The fourth section outlines the research design, including the description of the 
data, model specifications, firm-specific controls, and the variables used. The fifth section 
then presents the empirical results, and the final part of the paper discusses and concludes the 
study. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
CSR and the Insurance Industry 
The international insurance industry has long had a strategic interest in the CSR (e.g., 
environmental protection) activities of its corporate clients (e.g., oil and gas companies) as 
part of its routine underwriting procedures (Hsu, 2012). However, over the last decade or so 
CSR in the insurance industry has acquired a much higher profile in the public media than 
hitherto had been the case (WestLB AG, 2004; McKinsey, 2015). The increased visibility of 
CSR activities highlights the important role that insurers play in economy and society as both 
bearers/traders of insurable risks and institutional investors (Bhambri & Sonnenfeld, 1988). 
The increased public salience of CSR also reflects the greater political scrutiny of financial 
services firms following the 2007/8 global financial crisis and the major government bailouts 
of failed financial firms, most notably the US$182 billion US federal government support for 
the American International Group (AIG)  (Walls, Berrone & Phan, 2012). Recently, scholars 
such as Aguinis & Glavas (2012), Marquis & Qian (2014), and den Hond et al. (2014) posit 
that firms operating in high profile and heavily regulated sectors, such as financial services, 
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could voluntarily engage in philanthropy in order to secure economic and/or political benefits 
from government agencies (e.g., in terms of tax relief) and/or even avoid the costs of more 
substantive CSR engagement. 
A prominent philanthropic public profile could be strategically important for insurers 
as their basic business model involves writing a contractual (promissory) commitment to 
indemnify policyholder-customers for future losses in exchange for the receipt of regular 
premiums (i.e., 'solidity') (Gaa & Krinsky, 1988). The contractual nature of insurance 
transactions not only highlights the ethical (moral) importance of maintaining the trust and 
confidence of existing as well as prospective policyholders and investors, but also satisfying 
other key stakeholders such as brokers, reinsurers, and industry regulators, particularly with 
regard to the maintenance of future solvency (Boubakri, Dionne & Triki, 2008). The 
financial and risk management profile of insurers as well as the reputational interests of their 
managers and industry regulators, can thus be protected through the purchase of reinsurance 
in a similar way as investing in CSR activities such as charitable giving. Koh et al. (2014) 
find that CSR engagement is particularly value-enhancing in an ex-ante and ex-post sense for 
firms (e.g., those in extractive industries) that are intrinsically exposed to potentially high 
levels of litigation risk and commercial uncertainty. However, in the insurance industry other 
risk hedging tools, such as reinsurance (and likewise insurance in general industrial firms), 
could provide more cost-effective 'insurance protection' of a firm's franchise value than 
contributing to charitable causes. Therefore, in the insurance industry the CSR-risk 
management relation could be positively or inversely related, or even for some (e.g., small) 
insurance firms strategically disconnected. These aspects thus make the UK's non-life 
insurance industry not only a prospectively interesting sector within which to examine the 
risk management attributes and trade-offs associated with CSR-type activities such as 
philanthropy but also to extrapolate to the risk management-CSR functions in other industrial 
sectors, particularly other risk-trading financial firms, such as banks, that relative to their net 
annual earnings also donate little to charitable causes (Zimmeck & Pharoah, 2015). 
The UK's Non-Life Insurance Industry 
 The UK’s non-life insurance industry is the third largest in the world (after the US 
and Japan) and comprises approximately 300 or so active domestically-owned and foreign-
owned companies, subsidiaries and branches of varying size, ownership structure and output 
mix, which currently generates approximately £50 billion (US$72 billion) in gross annual 
premiums (International Underwriting Association, 2013)1. In addition, 94 active syndicates 
at the Lloyd's of London insurance market currently underwrite direct non-life premiums of 
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roughly £25.3 billion (US$37 billion) per annum, mainly in property and casualty lines of 
insurance (Lloyd's of London, 2014). As made clear earlier, issues of CSP have become even 
more publicly prominent since the 2007/8 global financial crisis and the associated major 
corporate failures and government bailouts. Such strategic risk management considerations 
are also important for UK-based insurers going forward with the implementation of the 
European Union’s (EU) new risk capital (Solvency II) requirements in January 2016. 
Additionally, trade surveys of CSR in international insurance markets (e.g., WestLB AG, 
2004; McKinsey, 2015) indicate that the CSR activities of insurers are potentially of interest 
to reinsurance companies as well as other stakeholders (e.g., industry regulators). For 
example, reinsurers could view corporate philanthropy as a signal that their insurance 
company clients are managed by boards of directors eager to promote a sustainable and 
socially aware and responsible business model to lawmakers, industry regulators, and others. 
In turn, such ‘public image-building’ could help reinsurers to generate future cash flows, 
increase firm value, and protect/promote their market brand-name. 
Corporate Philanthropy, Ethics and (Re)insurance 
 The concept of insurance as a promissory contract that compensates policyholders for 
economic loss fits closely with Carroll's (1979) three-dimensional view of CSR activities as 
overlapping economic, legal and ethical phenomena. Schwartz & Carroll (2003) add that the 
incidence and scale of discretionary ethical (philanthropic) activities could be influenced by 
the economic interests of dominant constituents such as shareholders and board-level 
executives. This 'micro' pragmatic notion of corporate philanthropy, reflected for example, in 
agency theory, contrasts with 'macro' perspectives that views corporate philanthropy, 
particularly in publicly visible organizations, as satisfying societal expectations of 'desirable' 
ethical behavior and moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Therefore, the decision of 
(insurance) firms to (re)insure and simultaneously donate to charitable organizations could 
help 'harmonize' the interests of key stakeholders (e.g., investors, managers and 
policyholders) with society's expectations of legitimate CSR behavior. Therefore, the 
concepts of corporate philanthropy, risk management and ethics are inextricably bound 
within the stakeholder constitution of organizations. 
Stakeholder Theory and (Re)insurance 
 To frame our research, we draw on strategic stakeholder theory - an established 
analytical framework in organizational management and business ethics literature (Phillips, 
Freeman & Wicks, 2003). Stakeholder theory emphasizes the pivotal role of the board of 
directors in interacting with stakeholders and balancing their (often conflicting) claims to 
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ensure that the firm is financially successful and remains a ‘going concern’ (Freeman, 1984). 
In fact, Walls et al. (2012, p. 904) state that a strategic stakeholder perspective can help 
researchers to ". . . investigate the very real and inseparable tensions between a firm's 
financial and social demands." El Akremi, Gond, Swaen, De Roeck & Igalens (2016) further 
emphasize that CSR-type decisions are context-specific, and reflect stakeholders' economic 
and social expectations. Additionally, Dewing & Russell (2008) note that the FSMA (2000), 
which regulates the governance and management of financial services firms, including 
insurers, is unique in the UK in that it is designed specifically to safeguard and balance the 
economic interests of plural stakeholders rather than just shareholders.  
Such scholars as Moore (2001), Laplume et al. (2008), and Chiu & Sharfman (2011) 
advocate that strategic stakeholder theory can be also provide a useful basis for conducting 
CSP research as it highlights how firms legitimize their relations with multiple stakeholders 
through CSR activities such as charitable giving. This is particularly apt in the case of this 
study as the multiple stakeholders of insurance firms have competing but overlapping 
economic and political goals (Bhambri & Sonnenfeld, 1988). Cole, McCullough, Semykina 
& Sommer (2011) add that in the insurance industry, salient stakeholder groups have a strong 
mutual interest in monitoring and controlling the risk-taking activities of insurance managers 
in order to ensure future solvency and the protection of their contractual claims. Agle et al. 
(1999) conceptualize the salience of firms' stakeholders in terms of their power (financial and 
political), legitimacy (legal and moral), and urgency (societal and economic). This is a useful 
analytical benchmark in the context of the present study as these three traits characterize 
insurance industry stakeholders and can be optimized using reinsurance. In a finance context, 
Navarro (1988) argues that corporate giving helps increase revenue (e.g., by promoting the 
firm’s brand-name), lower costs (e.g., of government enforcement actions), and saves taxes 
(e.g., by timing donations when marginal tax rates are high). However, in the insurance 
industry, reinsurance can achieve such strategic objectives more cost-effectively than 
philanthropy. Moreover, as reinsurance reduces insolvency, underwriting, and other financial 
risks in insurance firms, it concomitantly enables managers to protect the interests of less 
immediately powerful stakeholder groups, such as future generations of policyholders and 
minority shareholders (Cole et al., 2011). Such attributes are clearly important in a 'trust and 
relationship' business like insurance.  
Stakeholder analysis could also explain the nature of a potential substitutive relation 
between philanthropy and reinsurance. Indeed, some (e.g., larger and multiproduct) insurers 
may make modest investments in social projects as well as reinsure if the economic payoffs 
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from such philanthropic endeavours exceed the costs (e.g., by generating new business). The 
positive net present value (NPV) of such an investment in 'white-washing' could have wider 
stakeholder benefits beyond merely increasing value for shareholders. In contrast, other (e.g., 
small and niche) insurers are likely to have a less diversified customer-base whose economic 
interests are better served solely by purchasing reinsurance2. Therefore, stakeholder theory 
implies that differences in the reinsurance-philanthropy relation across insurance firms not 
only reflects the relative cost-effectiveness of reinsurance and CSR-type activities as 
strategic risk management options but also benefits a broader constituency of economic, 
social and political interests. 
Given the importance of reinsurance to the insurance industry, reinsurers are clearly 
important stakeholders for insurance firms (Cole et al., 2011). As a result, reinsurers could 
explicitly take societal legitimacy and other benefits of philanthropy into account in 
assessing the business (e.g., litigation) risks associated with their partnership with insurance 
firms. For example, by promoting public trust and market confidence - the essential 
ingredients of insurance - a prominent philanthropic stance could help an insurer to mitigate 
a decline of future free cash flows and/or increase in the costs of capital arising from 
financially damaging events such as a serious breakdown in corporate governance. To the 
extent that CSR-induced free cash flow generation and/or reputational capital protection 
reduces the risks of financial distress and/or bankruptcy for insurers then stakeholders other 
than reinsurers – for example, investors, policyholders, and industry regulators – could also 
value philanthropy. The legislative and regulatory structure of the UK insurance industry 
means that insurers are exposed to a high risk of litigation not only as a result of contractual 
dispute (e.g., policy mis-selling) but also statutory non-compliance (e.g., inadequate capital 
maintenance). According to Koh et al.  (2009), firms operating in highly litigious industries 
are, in theory at least, more likely to  benefit from 'positive moral capital' arising from CSR 
activities as it tempers the severity of ex-post sanctions from stakeholders in the event of a 
major shock event such as a high profile legal dispute. On the other hand, reinsurance can 
provide pragmatic (economic) and moral (reputational) legitimacy plus lowered exposure to 
socio-political risks for the salient stakeholders of insurance firms. Therefore, the 
stakeholders of insurance firms are likely to require the board of directors to strategically 
prioritize reinsurance over philanthropy.  
Strategic stakeholder theory also fits comfortably with recent research that links the 
resource allocation function of corporate governance with CSR strategy (e.g., see Hambrick, 
Werder & Zajac, 2008; Lan & Heracleous, 2010; Harjoto & Jo, 2011). Godfrey et al. (2010), 
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Koh et al. (2014), and others further contend that reputational insurance protection through 
CSR engagement can be particularly important in competitive environments, such as the 
UK's non-life insurance market, where customer switching costs and barriers of entry/exit 
tend to be low by international standards (Webb & Pettigrew, 1999). It is against this 
stakeholder theory backdrop that we now turn in developing our research hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Reinsurance-Charitable Donations Relation 
 As corporate philanthropy and reinsurance can, as noted earlier, conceivably perform 
similar strategic functions in alleviating market imperfections (e.g., information 
asymmetries) between an insurer's top management and its stakeholders, a substitutive (albeit 
non-equivalent) relation could exist between the decision to buy reinsurance and whether or 
not to engage in charitable giving. We argue that whilst CSR activities (e.g., philanthropy) 
and corporate (re)insurance serve the same strategic objective functions - namely, the 
maintained resilience and sustainability of the business - they are non-equivalent substitutes 
as the mechanism by which these two risk management options achieve these strategic goals 
will   be different. For example, philanthropy could at one level, signal narrow (e.g., local 
community) stakeholder involvement, while reinsurance promotes financial stability that 
benefits a broader constituency of investors, policyholders, regulators, amongst others. 
Indeed, in the UK's insurance industry the strategic role of reinsurance is underscored by 
industry regulation and statutory solvency maintenance requirements (Upreti & Adams, 
2015). On a more broader level, philanthropy (e.g., the sponsorship of medical research) can 
benefit multiple stakeholders at both a national and international level, and so have wider 
public appeal and more extensive brand development value (El Akremi et al., 2016). 
 Koh et al. (2014) further suggest that risk management tools such as (re)insurance are 
not strictly equivalent to the intrinsic insurance qualities of CSR-type activities because the 
former are based on explicit contracts enforceable in law, whilst the latter are based on the 
intangible goodwill of stakeholders. However, we argue that CSR-type activities can be 
viewed as examples of multi-period implicit contracts between a firm and its constituents. 
These less formalized contracting arrangements could nevertheless be the subject of legal 
dispute - for example, take the case of a firm operating in the extractive sector reneging on a 
CSR commitment to invest in environmental protection - a decision that then results in 
severe economic losses and social disruption in the event of catastrophe (e.g., a major flood). 
If the firm's stakeholders challenged such a 'broken CSR promise' in a court of law, 
judgement could affect the scope and/or scale of insurers' liabilities under insurance contracts 
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written with the firm, and in turn, possibly limit their ability to fully reclaim financial losses 
under reinsurance treaties.   
There are two main functions of reinsurance in insurance markets (and indeed, for 
insurance in general industrial settings). First, reinsurance helps instil ex-ante confidence in 
an insurer's financial viability amongst stakeholders thereby enabling it to grow/maintain 
product-market share. Second, reinsurance can enable an insurer to stabilize period earnings 
and reduce the risk of financial distress/bankruptcy ex-post a loss event (Abdul Kader et al., 
2010). As a brand protection strategy, investment in CSR activities likewise performs ex-ante 
and ex-post risk mitigation (Koh et al., 2014). Whilst reinsurance is extensively used in the 
non-life insurance industry (Froot & O’Connell, 2008), it could nonetheless represent an 
opportunity loss to shareholders and other constituents unless it preserves and/or adds 
economic value to the insurance firm. Therefore, the board of directors is likely to prioritize 
the strategic decision to reinsure since it optimally protects the interdependent interests of the 
full constituency of stakeholders against the risk of financial distress/bankruptcy over an 
investment in corporate philanthropy that may only benefit a narrow constituency (e.g., see 
Lan & Heracleous, 2010). This reasoning suggests a substitutive (negative) relation between 
reinsurance and the corporate decision to donate to charitable causes, and the amount of 
money contributed. Consequently: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between reinsurance and the 
decision to make  donations. 
 H1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between reinsurance and the 
amount donated. 
On the other hand, the nature of the  reinsurance-corporate donations relation could 
be complementary (positive). Insurers use reinsurance as a claims contingent capital 
alternative to holding (costly) equity and reserves (Abdul Kader et al., 2010). This has three 
main economic advantages for insurance firms. First, reinsurance tends to be more cost-
effective and easier to secure than equity capital (e.g., due to lower frictional and supply 
costs). Second, reinsurance can help managers stabilize period earnings and reduce future 
taxes - particularly under the progressive corporate tax codes that exist in most developed 
economies, including the UK and US. Third, reinsurers provide ancillary risk management 
services (e.g., loss prevention advice), which can add 'real value' for primary insurers 
especially those operating in new and/or highly specialist segments of the market (Upreti & 
Adams, 2015). These strategic benefits of reinsurance could provide the free cash flows and 
contingent capital provisions necessary for insurers to not only engage in discretionary 
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philanthropic activities such as charitable giving that advantage specific constituents (e.g., 
local communities),  but also influence the level of investment in CSR projects that realize 
benefits for a much broader range of stakeholders at both the national and international 
scales. 
Reinsurers, as key stakeholders could also be motivated to encourage philanthropy 
amongst their primary insurance clients as it could help them increase future rates of new 
business growth, improve the public visibility of the corporate brand,  and/or minimize the 
risk (and cost) of regulatory intervention (Hsu, 2012) 3 . Indeed, recent adverse media 
publicity affecting the insurance industry in the UK and elsewhere - for example, with regard 
to product mis-selling, disputed insurance claims, and unclear and disputed contractual terms 
(Kvalnes, 2011) - could stimulate reinsurers to advise and encourage their primary insurance 
partners to donate to charitable causes in order to generate goodwill with other economically 
and/or politically influential stakeholders, such as investors and industry regulators. Such a 
strategy could be particularly beneficial for insurers entering new product-markets and/or 
operating in lines of business (e.g., pensions mis-selling) that have been subject to adverse 
media attention. Therefore:  
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relation between reinsurance and the 
decision to make  donations. 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relation between reinsurance and the 
amount donated. 
Moderating-Effects of Board Composition 
 Recent management research (e.g., Jia, 2013, 2014) stresses the importance of testing 
for potential moderating-effects in predicted relations between variables. Harjoto & Jo 
(2011) note that board composition can particularly influence philanthropy as stakeholder 
and strategic risk management are integral to effective corporate governance. Accordingly, in 
our multivariate analysis we use, and briefly motivate, six variables identified as important in 
prior CSR studies to capture the moderating-effects of board composition on the relation 
between reinsurance and charitable giving.  
 Outside Directors: To promote their ‘human capital’ value, independent outside 
directors on the board could attempt to balance the conflicting resource claims of different 
constituents beyond the narrow goal of maximizing shareholders utility by reinsuring and 
engaging in philanthropy (Ibrahim, Howard & Angelidis, 2003). Moreover, in promoting 
earnings stability reinsurance could help insurers to accumulate the necessary resources 
needed to fund philanthropic projects and thus promote the public reputations of board 
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outsiders as prudent and socially responsible managers. This is likely to be an important 
motivation in a public trust orientated and regulated business like insurance Therefore: 
 H3a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive moderating relation between reinsurance 
 and proportion of outsiders on the board and the decision to donate/amount 
 donated. 
 CEO-Chairman Separation: Separating the CEO from the Chairman functions could 
reduce the degree of CEO power on the board and so better serve the socio-economic 
interests of a broader spectrum of stakeholders (Combs, Ketchen, Perryman & Donahue, 
2007). Reinsurance, in conjunction with separating the CEO and Chairman functions, could 
also help reduce the adverse effects of risk-taking and maintain financial stability. Again, 
such qualities are particularly important in a highly regulated and public trust-dependent 
industry such as insurance. This could increase the propensity of insurance firms to both 
reinsure and donate to charitable causes. As a result: 
 H3b: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive moderating relation between reinsurance 
 and CEO-Chairman separation and the decision to donate/amount donated. 
 Inside Ownership: Owner-managers could engage in reinsurance and charitable 
giving in order to fulfil personal welfare objectives and/or assuage the claims of other 
stakeholders thereby complementing the link between reinsurance and philanthropy (Coffey 
& Wang, 1998). For example, reinsurance could allow owner-managers to concomitantly 
mage assumed risks and promote a philanthropic public profile - again a quality that is likely 
to be particularly important in a public trust and risk protection important business such as 
insurance. Accordingly: 
 H3c: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive moderating relation between inside 
 ownership and reinsurance and the decision to donate/amount donated. 
 CEO Bonus plans: Mahoney & Thorn (2006) report that CEO bonuses can facilitate 
CSR engagement as they can reduce the potentially deleterious reputational consequences 
arising from public media criticism of perceived excesses in executive compensation. By 
improving corporate solvency and signalling prudential management reinsurance could 
therefore  limit the likelihood that CEO incentive compensation will attract adverse public 
criticism. Consequently: 
 H3d: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive moderating relation between CEO bonus 
 plans and reinsurance and the  decision to donate/amount donated. 
 Board-Level Female Directors: Prior studies (e.g., Brammer, Millington & Pavelin, 
2009) suggest that female directors tend to be behaviorally inclined to precautionary 
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strategies, and more sensitive to balancing the needs and requirements of different 
stakeholders of the firm than their male counterparts. Therefore, the female board members 
of insurance firms could actively promote charitable giving and risk reduction strategies such 
as reinsurance as part of a prudent and precautionary approach to business management. 
Such reasoning implies: 
 H3e: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive moderating relation between the proportion 
 of females on the board and reinsurance and the  decision to donate/amount donated. 
 Board-Level Financial Experts: The presence of professional finance experts (e.g., 
actuaries and/or accountants) on the board could positively influence charitable giving - for 
example, as a result of CSR guidelines issued by their respective professional bodies (e.g., 
the UK's Association of Chartered Certified Accountants CSR Report (2011)). The purchase 
of reinsurance could also enable professionally qualified financial experts on the boards of 
insurance firms to realize both CSR-related goals and protect the interest of key stakeholders 
such as policyholders, investors and industry regulators. As a result: 
 H3f: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive moderating relation between the proportion 
 of financial experts on the board and reinsurance and the decision to donate/amount 
 donated. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
 A balanced panel sample of 77 UK-based non-life insurance insurers (924 data 
points) for which complete time-series data exist for the 12 years 1999 to 2010 are used to 
test our hypotheses4. CSR decisions can be given different strategic emphasis from one year 
to another depending on factors such as changes in managerial priorities and firms’ financial 
condition (Godfrey et al., 2010). Therefore, we consider that a longitudinal analysis is an 
appropriate approach to use in the current study. Moreover, the size of the panel data set was 
restricted in that statutory firm-level financial data had to be hand-matched with corporate 
donations and demographic governance details that were not always readily available for 
some insurers over the analysis period.  
Our data derive as follows: (a) insurance data were obtained from Standard & Poor's 
Synthesys insurance companies’ database, which is sourced from the regulatory returns 
submitted annually by UK insurance companies to the then industry regulator - the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA)5; and (b) data on governance structures and corporate donations 
were obtained from the annual reports and accounts, internet and charity sources, and UK 
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insurance company directories. In the case of composite (life and non-life) insurers in our 
panel sample that only report group-level donations, the non-life insurance subsidiary's 
annual share of charitable giving is estimated on a pro-rata of its contribution to annual group 
gross premiums written. The timeframe covered by our study includes the years from when 
CSR started to be of direct strategic interest to UK insurers following some high profile 
corporate failures to the time just after the 2007/8 global financial crisis6. We conduct our 
analysis at the UK insurance firm-level as this is the relevant decision-making unit for 
financial reporting, statutory solvency monitoring, and most discretionary decisions (e.g., on 
CSR issues) that affect the local market. Our panel sample of 77 firms constitutes roughly 
25% of non-life insurers actively operating in the UK over our period of analysis, and 
comprises a mix of firms of varying size, ownership, and financial structure. The majority of 
insurers in our data set (n=67/87%) are stock companies of which roughly one-third are small 
mono-line insurers that specialize in niche segments of the market (e.g., personal lines). 
Furthermore, most stock insurers in the data set (n=60/90%) are non-listed entities. However, 
the preponderance of stock over mutual forms of organization, and non-publicly quoted stock 
insurers in our data set precludes us from controlling for organizational form and 
public/private listing status in our analysis. 
 Main Variables of Interest  
 Like some previous studies (e.g., Brown, Helland & Smith, 2006), we treat direct 
(cash) donations as our dependent measure of corporate philanthropy. This measure excludes 
philanthropic benefits-in-kind to charities such as tax advice, and indirect charitable 
contributions such as payments made under voluntary employee pay-as-you-earn schemes7. 
Donations to charitable and altruistic (as opposed to promotional) community causes are a 
quantifiable aspect of corporate philanthropy, which in the UK can be obtained or estimated 
from companies’ annual reports and other public media (e.g., corporate brochures and 
charitable organizations) (Brammer & Millington, 2003, 2004, 2008) 8 . Charitable 
contributions are also an important form of discretionary corporate expenditure and they are 
often viewed as a prime and integral aspect of CSR activity (Masulis & Reza, 2015). 
Brammer & Millington (2004, pp.1412-1413) further argue that because of their lower 
susceptibility to measurement error (unlike multidimensional CSR indices) charitable 
donations are ". . . an excellent mechanism through which to observe and analyse the 
interface between stakeholders, corporate strategy, and CSR." Peloza (2006) also notes that 
corporate philanthropy has broad socio-economic and environmental impacts that can 
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directly create business benefits as well as build 'moral capital' for the donator. For example, 
in the context of the insurance industry, support for community land improvements could 
have environmental benefits such as lowering the risk of insurance losses due to flooding, 
coastal erosion, and/or storm damage. In this way, charitable donations can correlate closely 
with broader CSR engagement. Moreover, unlike some other countries, such as the US, 
charitable donations in the UK tend to be made directly by companies rather than 'hidden' via 
intermediary charitable foundations (Brammer & Millington, 2008). This institutional 
advantage circumvents the potentially confounding effects of reduced 
shareholder/stakeholder accountability and agency problems that can arise when board-level 
executives use corporate resources to fund foundation charities with which they are 
personally affiliated (Masulis & Reza, 2015). 
We acknowledge that whilst a precise indicator, corporate giving is a single 
dimension of the multifaceted CSP profile of a firm (Jo & Na, 2012). However, as noted by 
several scholars (e.g. Entine, 2003; Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008; Krüger,2014) composite 
CSR indices that derive from multiple data sources collected and compiled by CSR ratings 
firms such as Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co Inc. (KLD) have major limitations. For 
example, despite claims of construct validity (e.g., Godfrey et al., 2009), many others (e.g., 
Krüger, 2014) argue that aggregate CSR indices are highly susceptible to: (a) measurement 
error (especially when component scores are based on subjective sources such as interview 
evidence); (b) sample selection bias (e.g., KLD data only relate to US publicly listed firms); 
and (c) limited comparability when used in longitudinal and transnational contexts, 
particularly when non-overlapping samples are used. For these reasons, and on the grounds 
of precision, we use charitable donations as our preferred measure of philanthropy.  
Our main independent variable of interest in this study is reinsurance - a commonly 
used hedging (balance sheet and earnings protection) tool on which data, unlike for corporate 
insurance, are publicly available in the UK and indeed, other insurance markets such as the 
US and some European countries. It is further pertinent to note that as a pure indemnity 
mechanism, reinsurance cannot be used for speculation (unlike other hedging instruments 
such as derivatives) (Zou & Adams, 2008). This means that in using reinsurance data, our 
study provides a potentially robust and reliable test of the corporate philanthropy-risk 
management relation. 
Firm-Related Control Variables 
  Prior stakeholder theory-based studies (e.g., Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Brammer & 
Millington, 2008; Barnett & Salomon, 2012) indicate that in the context of exploring 
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corporate donations firm-specific factors can also be relevant. Therefore, we control for 
seven firm-related variables in our analysis: (a) firm size; (b) ownership structure; (c) 
managerial (insider) ownership; (d) leverage; (e) profitability; (f) product-line and (g) firm 
age. We expect concentrated ownership structure and leverage to be inversely related to the 
decision to commit to charitable giving, and the amount given. For example, dominant 
shareholders (such as pension funds) are likely to maximize their financial claims in order to 
meet obligations to their constituents (e.g., pensioners), whereas highly levered (cash 
constrained) insurers are less likely to donate to charitable causes). The other firm-specific 
variables are predicted to be positively related to the incidence and level of corporate 
charitable donations. For example, large, well-established, and profitable insurers are likely 
to have the 'slack' resources to contribute to charitable causes, while owner-managers, in 
conjunction with their reinsurance partners, may engage in philanthropy to raise the public 
visibility of the corporate profile and so increase future rates of new business. Multi-product 
line insurers tend to have a more diversified customer-base and broader stakeholder 
constituency than niche (e.g., personal lines) insurance providers, and as such, more likely to 
engage in philanthropy. Details of the measurement of our variables, and their predicted 
signs, are given in Table 19. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Modelling 
 As in previous CSR research (e.g., Harjoto & Jo, 2011), we model the charitable 
donation-reinsurance relation using a two-step regression procedure. A separate analysis of 
the corporate decision to make charitable donations and the amount donated is necessary as it 
is not possible to formulate and test a single model that simultaneously captures both first-
stage and second-stage strategic choices. The first 'participation' model (random-effects 
bivariate probit) tests the decision to donate or not, and the second 'volume' model (a left-
censored tobit) estimates the amount donated.10 Another rationale for adopting our two-part 
modelling approach to the 'participation' and 'volume' decisions is that it could reveal insights 
into the focal firm factors (e.g., size and structure) that could influence the respective 
philanthropic and reinsurance decisions of managers. It is also possible that reinsurance 
could be linked indirectly with charitable giving through its mediation with other financial 
variables such as profitability. Therefore, we applied Heckman's (1979) two-step sample 
selection correction procedure which includes the inverse 'Mills ratio' correction (λ) in the 
second-stage 'volume' model.  
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 In the 'participation' model the dependent variable (DONDUM) is binary, taking the 
value 1 if an insurer donates to charities, and 0 otherwise. Our choice of the probit model 
over other binary dependent variable models (e.g., logit) is based on the assumption that the 
indicator variable of interest (in our case charitable donations) is not random but a deliberate 
strategic decision conditioned by probabilistic rather than other (e.g., log-normal) distribution 
assumptions (Greene, 2003). The random-effects estimator is preferred as some of our 
variables (notably reinsurance) show little within-firm variation over the panel period (1999 
to 2010) (Greene, 2003). To check the validity of the random-effects estimator we conducted 
a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), under the null hypothesis that unobservable 
firm-effects are serially uncorrelated with the explanatory variables thus minimizing the risk 
of sample selection bias. The Hausman test did not reject the null hypothesis thereby 
supporting the random-effects specification. We also control for unobserved firm-related 
heterogeneity (e.g., differences in managerial ability) in the 'participation' model since failure 
to do so could lead to biased coefficient estimates and endogeneity concerns (Heckman, 
1981)11. Our random-effects probit model is thus: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡         (1)  
In equation (1), P* denotes the unobservable factors influencing an insurer’s propensity 
to donate, or not donate to charitable causes. We assume that the incidence of charitable 
donations is observed only when the insurer’s propensity to donate exceeds zero. We thus 
have: 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0 and 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ is a vector of time-varying explanatory 
variables (defined in Table 1); 𝛽 is a vector of the parameters to be estimated; and i = 1, 2, . . 
.  n indexes the sample observations for the period t investigated. To capture unobservable 
effects (e.g., managerial CSR experience) on the 'participation' decision we decompose the 
error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 in (1) as:  
      𝑣𝑖𝑡=𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡         (2)  
In equation (2), 𝛼𝑖  denotes unobserved heterogeneous firm-effects that are time-invariant, 
while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved firm characteristics that do vary across time; we also treat 𝛼𝑖 
as random. The random-effects probit model is estimated using the maximum likelihood 
procedure under the condition that:  𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) , 𝑢𝑖𝑡  are independent of vector X; and 
𝛼𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼
2), the 𝛼𝑖are independent of the 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and vector X. To gauge the sensitivity of the 
explanatory variables to changes in the predicted probability of the corporate donation 
decision, the coefficient estimates in the probit model are transformed to represent the 
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marginal-effects evaluated at the means of the regressor variables computed from averaging 
individual observation responses (Hoetker, 2007). Similarly, marginal-effects are also 
evaluated against median values given the skewed distribution of some variables (e.g., firm 
size) in the panel data set. The marginal-effects for the dummy variables are calculated as the 
discrete change in the dependent variable as it changes from 0 to 1 (Greene, 2003).  
The tobit ('volume' decision) model assumes that the dependent variable (Y*it) (DON) 
is a non-limited (positive) observation truncated at 0. That is: 
Y*it =β*Xit + λ +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 - N(0 δ
2 ))      (3) 
In equation 3, β*Xit is a vector of the explanatory variables (as defined in Table 1); λ is the 
inverse Mills ratio; and  𝑢𝑖𝑡  is a normally distributed error term that captures random 
influences on the variables to be estimated (Greene, 2003).  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 We report the descriptive statistics for our panel of insurance firms in Table 2 (panels 
A and B). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 The average annual value of charitable donations (DON) for our panel sample of UK 
non-life insurers given in panel A is £50,000; this figure is low as it is less than 1% of 
average net annual profit (before interest and tax) and only about 4% of average yearly 
selling expenditures over the period of analysis (1999 to 2010). Moreover, just over 40% of 
the insurers in our panel data set do not to donate to charitable organizations at all. These 
observations are consistent with Brown et al. (2006) who report that despite being highly 
regulated and publicly salient entities, financial services firms tend to invest less (in relative 
and absolute terms) in CSR activities than other firms – especially those operating in high 
‘externality impact’ sectors such as mining and petro-chemicals. The notes to Table 2 also 
indicate that of our panel sample, 35 insurers (46%) consistently did not donate to charitable 
causes over time, while larger more visible insurers regularly made charitable contributions 
though the sums involved varied each year. This observation supports Chiu & Sharfman's 
(2011, p. 1560) conjecture that CSR activities will in all likelihood ". . . not be uniform . . . 
across firms within industries because firms . . . vary in the amount of attention that they 
attract." The insurers in our UK panel data set on average cede just over a third of their 
annual premiums to their reinsurance partners compared with a mean of 16% of reinsured 
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annual premiums reported for the UK’s life insurance industry by Abdul Kader et al. (2010). 
The lower amount of risk retention (greater the amount reinsured) in our sample reflects the 
greater unpredictability of the risks underwritten in non-life insurance compared with the life 
insurance sector where relatively more accurate actuarial pricing and reserving practices are 
more prevalent (Froot & O’Connell, 2008).  
The other financial characteristics of the sample given in Table 2 (panel A) not 
surprisingly indicate a large variation in our sample of insurance firms in terms of firm size 
(SIZE), profitability (PROFIT) and age (AGE). Given the highly regulated nature of the UK’s 
insurance industry (Webb & Pettigrew, 1999), the premium-to-surplus ratios (LEV) for our 
sample of insurance firms suggest that despite a few cases of low leverage (minimum = 0.53) 
overall mean/median levels of solvency were satisfactory during the period of analysis (i.e., 
>1.0). The descriptive statistics for product-line (P-LINE) also show that the insurers in our 
panel sample range from multiproduct providers to niche operators. 
The board composition statistics indicate an average board size of seven members. 
This figure is fairly consistent with the average board size of eight directors reported in 
Hardwick, Adams & Zou (2011) for the UK’s life insurance industry over the period 1994 to 
2004. Additionally, the majority of board members in our panel data set (mean = 55%) are 
independent outside directors as recommended by the Cadbury Report (1992). Also 
consistent with the Cadbury Report (1992), the vast majority (mean = 92%) of the insurers in 
our sample separate the CEO and Chairman functions. The mean proportion of board 
members who are qualified finance professionals (accountants and actuaries) was 28% over 
the period of our analysis. The observed presence of board-level financial experts is as we 
expected given the technically complex nature of non-life insurance business. However, the 
average proportion of females on the board (G-MIX) during our sample period is low (mean 
= 3%).  
To get more of a handle on the characteristics of those in insurers in our data set that 
engage in philanthropy and those that do not, in panels B and C of Table 2  we split our panel 
sample between charitable donators and non-donators. From panels B and C it is evident that 
insurers contributing to charitable causes are bigger and less heavily reinsured. This suggests 
that compared to small insurers, large insurers are likely to have the resources tro invest in 
philanthropy and more effectively lower their risk through diversification.   In addition, we 
conducted t-tests (for metric measured variables) and Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney U tests 
(WMWU) and Chi-square (χ2) statistics (where variables are categorical) to determine 
whether statistically significant differences exist in the mean values for the organizational 
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characteristics of charitable donators and non-donators in our data set. This procedure is 
particularly useful given the presence of some extreme values in the distribution of the panel 
data. The statistical tests of mean difference are reported in Table 2, panel D. They show that 
statistically significant differences exist between the means of all our explanatory variables 
(at p≤0.05, two-tail, or better). Most notably, insurers that donate to charities tend to be 
larger, more profitable, and more established firms, while insurance firms that do not 
contribute to charitable causes are generally smaller and more highly reinsured entities. 
These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in panels B and C, and 
again hints strongly at firm size/age/profitability-effects influencing the decision to engage in 
corporate philanthropy.  
Correlation Analysis 
 Table 3 reports the correlation coefficient matrix for the variables (including 
interaction terms) used in the study. Table 3 confirms the expected positive firm size/board 
size, age, and profitability influences, and negative leverage effects on the donation decision 
and insurers’ financial commitment to charities. Statistically significant and positive 
associations between the donation decision/amount of charitable contributions also exist 
between insider ownership plus the proportion of outsiders and women on the board (at 
p≤0.05, two-tail or better). In addition, negatively significant associations are found between 
corporate donations and reinsurance (our main variable of interest) and as we previously 
predicted, ownership structure. Also, as expected donations are positively and significantly 
linked when reinsurance interacts with inside ownership and the proportion of female 
directors on the board. However, contrary to expectations when CEO incentive compensation 
interacts with reinsurance the moderating effect is negative suggesting that the 'risk reduction 
-effect' of reinsurance reduces the need for CEOs to use philanthropy to reduce the possible 
adverse public effects arising from the disclosure of CEO bonuses and other benefits.   
However, some of the high and statistically significant correlation coefficients reported in 
Table 3 raises the possibility of multicollinearity. Therefore, we follow Kennedy (2003) and 
derive variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the explanatory variables12. The VIF for BSIZE 
(22.35) - the only VIF computed - was greater than the ‘acceptable’ threshold value of 10. 
Therefore, we excluded BSIZE from our multivariate analysis to mitigate possible bias 
arising from multicollinearity.13 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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Multivariate Analysis 
Probit Results 
 The results of the probit analysis, including the mean/median evaluated marginal-
effects, are reported in Table 4. Table 4 gives three models beginning with the base-line 
model 1 (excluding reinsurance), then adds in a step-wise manner reinsurance with the board 
composition variables and interaction terms in models 2 and 3. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Table 4 indicates that consistent with H1a, reinsurance (REINS) is negatively related 
to the decision to engage in charitable giving (at p ≤ 0.01, one-tail) in models 2 and 3. This 
observation suggests that compared with reinsurance, CSR activities do not perform a 
significant strategic risk management function in the UK’s non-life insurance industry. These 
results support the observations made by other researchers (e.g., Brown et al., 2006) that 
charitable giving tends to be a lower strategic priority in the financial services sector 
compared with industries like mining whose operations can generate obvious negative 
externalities. The marginal-effects computed at the mean/median values (panel B) indicate 
that when incorporating other board-level factors (but not the interactions) in model 2, 
reinsurance reduces the probability of corporate giving by 341%/72%. In other words, 
reinsurance exhibits a strong substitutive relation with the corporate decision to donate to 
charities.  
The full probit results (given in models 1 to 3 of Table 4) confirm our earlier 
correlation coefficient analysis (Table 3) in that they show that the donation decision is 
directly related to the size (R(SIZE)) and age (R(AGE)) of insurers (at p ≤ 0.01, one-tail) even 
when rank transformations are applied to limit the potentially confounding effects of extreme 
values. These findings make sense intuitively as large firms usually have more discretionary 
funds to invest in pro-social projects than small firms (Brammer & Millington, 1998). As 
predicted, ownership concentration (OWN) is found to be negatively associated with the 
decision to give to charitable causes (at p ≤ 0.01, one-tail) when other board-level factors 
come into play (see Table 4, model 3). This suggests that as expected, dominant investors 
could counter altruistic initiatives by some board members (e.g., outsiders) in an attempt to 
maximize their private claims on the firm’s free cash flows. Moreover, insider ownership 
(INSIDE) is, as we expected, positively related to the decision to engage in corporate 
philanthropy in models 2 and 3 (at p ≤ 0.05, one-tail or better). This finding suggests that 
charitable contributions could help the owner-managers of insurance firms to increase the 
corporate brand-name and product-market share, and therefore enhance the value of their 
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equity investment. Whilst 'correctly' signed, leverage (LEV) is not statistically significant in 
Table 4, models 1 to 3. 
In terms of our board-level governance variables, the propensity of insurers to donate 
to charitable causes is positively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board (OUTS), , 
and the presence of female directors (G-MIX) (see models 2 and 3). These findings are 
statistically significant (at p ≤ 0.05, one-tail or better) and they accord with what we 
hypothesized in  H3a, H3b, and H3e. Ostensibly, our observation regarding G-MIX supports 
the often cited claim that in terms of their decision-making behavior, female directors tend to 
be more inclined to balance stakeholders’ different interests and support CSR initiatives than 
their male counterparts (e.g., see Brammer et al., 2009). It is also interesting to note that all 
the CEOs in our panel data set – most of whom (84% per Table 2, panel A) had bonus 
schemes in place – were male. We also observe that COMP is inversely related to the 
decision to engage in corporate charitable giving (at p ≤ 0.01, two-tail). This finding is 
contrary to what was hypothesized (H3d), and suggests that private wealth maximization 
predominates over social philanthropy amongst the CEOs in our sample of insurance firms. 
This finding also confirms recent survey evidence obtained by McKinsey (2015) from the US 
property-casualty insurance industry that indicates only a minority (30%) of CEOs surveyed 
play a leadership role in charitable giving. The presence of financial expertise on the board 
(PROF) also reduces the probability of charitable giving (at p≤0.01, one tail) in model 3 of 
Table 4; this finding is inconsistent with H3f. However, the median marginal-effects of these 
observed negative relations on the donation decision of COMP and PROF are fairly 
moderate at 11% to 10%, respectively. Nevertheless, this observation runs contrary to prior 
research (e.g., Mahoney & Thorn, 2006) that argues that the existence of board directors’ 
bonus plans can promote CSR engagement and so enhance firms’ franchise value and market 
brand-name. Rather our results support the view of other scholars (e.g., Coombs & Gilley, 
2005) who argue that CEOs are likely to be disinclined to support corporate philanthropy if it 
reduces payoffs on their bonus plans. Additionally, the negative coefficient estimate for 
PROF in models 2 and 3 of Table 4 is inconsistent with the notion that financial experts on 
the board are likely to be familiar with, and thus inclined towards, CSR-type activity and its 
disclosure in the annual report and accounts. However, in our probit analysis the effect of 
product-lines (P-LINE) on the corporate donations decision is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels of 5% or better in any of the models reported in Table 4.  
 We also included interaction terms in our probit analysis (in Table 4, model 3) given 
the potential moderating-effects of board-level governance on reinsurance (REINS) and the 
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decision to donate to charitable causes (e.g., see Walls et al., 2012)14.  Model 3 indicates that 
the corporate decision to engage in charitable giving is now affected positively by the 
existence of CEO bonuses (REINS x COMP) (at p≤0.01, two-tail) and negatively (at p≤0.05, 
two-tail or better) by the proportion of insider ownership  (REINS x INSIDE), and the 
proportion of female board members (REINS x G-MIX). The positive coefficient estimates 
for REINS x COMP suggests that as reinsurance promotes the key strategic goals of 
corporate solvency and profitability (Abdul Kader et al., 2010), it can have a positive 
interactive impact on both the decision to give to charitable causes and CEO compensation. 
The statistically significant negative coefficient estimate for REINS x INSIDE (at p≤0.01) 
suggests that the financial benefits of reinsurance reduce the need for manager-owners to 
donate money to charitable causes in order to mitigate business risks. Moreover, the 
statistically significant (at p≤0.05, two-tail) and negative coefficient estimate for the 
interaction term REINS x G-MIX  hints that although potentially sympathetic to corporate 
philanthropy, female board members (recall most of whom in this case are outside directors) 
may in practice assign a higher strategic priority to solvency and risk management issues 
than they do to discretionary matters such as CSR investment. This could reflect a 
predominantly precautionary and self-interested approach to business strategy among outside 
directors collectively and female directors in particular. Perhaps somewhat controversially, 
these results imply that such board members are primarily concerned with protecting and 
promoting their ‘human capital’ value in the managerial job market than simply being 
innately altruistic in their support for charitable causes. The predominance of self-interest 
over altruism amongst board members irrespective of their demographic traits (e.g., gender) 
has also been reported in prior corporate governance research (e.g., see Brickley & 
Zimmerman, 2010). Panel B of Table 4 indicates that the median marginal effects of the 
interaction of reinsurance with inside ownership and female directorships reduces the 
probability of donating to charitable causes by the substantive percentages of 54% and 36% 
respectively. 
Tobit Results  
The results of our tobit analysis are presented in Table 5 (models 1 to 3). In 
accordance with H1b and the first-stage probit analysis reported in Table 4, the tobit results 
confirm that reinsurance (REINS) is inversely related to the amount donated to charities (at 
p≤0.05 or better, one-tail). Furthermore, the mean-level marginal-effects reported in Table 5 
suggest that in practical economic terms £1 spent on reinsurance reduces corporate charitable 
donations by between 4% and 17%. The tobit results for our board-level variables are 
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consistent both with what we hypothesized and the probit analysis. We also find that 
consistent with the earlier probit analysis, firm size (R(SIZE)) and age (R(AGE)) directly 
influence the amount of charitable giving, while concentrated ownership structure (OWN) 
and now leverage (LEV) are negatively linked with the level of charitable contributions (at 
p≤0.01, one-tail) as expected. The statistical significance of LEV in the tobit analysis 
suggests that lowly levered insurers are more likely than their highly levered counterparts to 
have the spare resource capacity needed to engage in philanthropy. Models 2 and 3 of Table 
5 also indicate that INSIDE is directly related not only to the propensity to donate but also 
with the financial amount donated (at p≤0.01, one-tail). This suggests that contributing to 
charitable causes could benefit owner-managers (e.g., in terms of enhanced public 
reputation).   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Turning to the interaction terms in model 3, we find that consistent with the probit 
analysis, REINS x INSIDE is negative and statistically significant (at p≤0.01, two-tail). 
However, this is the only statistically significant interaction term in the tobit analysis and 
supports the view that risk mitigation benefits of purchasing reinsurance dilutes the 
incentives of owner-managers to donate large sums to charitable causes.  We also observe 
that the explanatory power (McFadden's adjusted pseudo-R2) of our models in Tables 4 and 5 
increases incrementally under the three regression model analyses carried out in the probit 
and tobit tests. This suggests that the incidence and propensity of corporate donations are 
influenced by reinsurance acting in a substitutive manner and conjointly with other board-
level and firm-related factors. In addition, the inverse mills ratio (λ) is statistically significant 
in all three models in the tobit analysis, which justifies controlling for selection bias in order 
to improve the consistency of the parameter estimates.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Drawing a framework from strategic stakeholder theory and using UK non-life 
insurance firm-level panel data for the 12 years 1999-2010, we examine empirically the link 
between corporate charitable donations and the purchase of reinsurance and after controlling 
for the moderating-effects of board composition and the financial characteristics of insurance 
firms. We find that consistent with H1a and H1b, reinsurance substitutes for charitable 
giving as it more cost-effectively satisfies the socio-economic and political interests of a 
broader constituency of major stakeholders. Our finding of a statistically significant negative 
relation between charitable donations and reinsurance also explains why financial services 
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firms in general, and insurers in particular, are often viewed as poor contributors to CSR 
activities compared with industries (e.g., mining) that generate negative externalities (e.g., 
see Brown et al., 2006; Pharoah & Walker, 2015; Zimmeck & Walker, 2015). In this regard, 
our results challenge the view of Marquis & Qian (2014) and others, that publicly prominent 
firms are more likely than other firms to engage in CSR-type activities. We also find that 
CEO bonus plans reduce the propensity of insurers to donate to charitable causes, although 
this effect may be ameliorated by the interaction of reinsurance in terms of the amounts 
donated. Additionally, we observe that firm size, age and insider ownership are positively 
linked in preliminary analyses to the corporate decision to contribute to charitable causes as 
well as the extent of such CSR investment. Preliminary tests incorporating board 
composition variables indicate a positive relation between the decision to contribute, and the 
financial amount of charitable contributions, and the proportion of outsiders and females on 
the board. However,  negative interactive effect between reinsurance and the proportion of 
outsiders and females on the board and the corporate donations decision revealed by our 
probit analysis is interesting in that it suggests that risk management predominates the 
collective thinking of board members (including outsiders and female members) as it is 
critical to realizing the key strategic objectives such as solvency maintenance and earnings 
stability, and hence improved job security. 
 The main conclusion of this study is that philanthropy matters in a risk management 
sense only if the economic gains to stakeholders with definable and enforceable 
contracting/transacting claims on firms exceed the benefits of financial risk hedging 
mechanisms (such as (re)insurance). Our empirical evidence further  implies that the strategic 
benefits of CSR investment in general, and charitable giving in particular, are likely to vary 
between firms and across industrial sectors depending on the different strategic risks and risk 
management tools/expertise that might, or might not exist. As a result, insights gleaned from 
our research could enable managers, investors and others to more critically evaluate the cost 
and benefits of CSR-type activities in the context of other risk management strategies. The 
results of our research could be extended to other parts of the financial sector (e.g., banking) 
where insurance and other risk hedging activities undermine strategic and operational 
decisions.  
 Our study could also provide a basis for examining the 'CSR-as-insurance' aspects of 
firms operating in non-financial sectors where the effective management of economic risks 
and stakeholders' interests are likely to be critically important - for example, as in extractive 
industries that are heavily engaged in the management of potential economic losses due to 
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such business risks as environmental hazards and potential litigation. For example, prior 
studies (e.g., Koh et al., 2014) note that firms operating in industries (e.g., mining) with 
potential negative externalities of production are more likely to invest in philanthropy and 
wider CSR activities in order to mitigate the risk of litigation and loss of goodwill (franchise 
value) in the event of business mishap. Future cross-industry research could therefore 
usefully extend the research agenda by examining the extent to which investment in 
philanthropy and other aspects of CSR behavior are influenced by the use of more 
conventional (formal) risk management practices (e.g., insurance) and other firm-specific and 
sector-based factors. For example, firm-level variations between CSR investment and 
corporate insurance spending could reflect differences in asset insurability between firms 
operating in different industries such the technology sector where growth options arise from 
intangible assets (e.g., know-how), and those industries (e.g., oil and gas) whose market 
value is highly dependent on the effective use of physical assets.  
We consider that our study makes three major contributions to the literature. We 
believe this study is the first to test empirically the influence of reinsurance on the decision 
of insurers to contribute to charities, and the amount donated. This is particularly apt in the 
case of the insurance industry, which is an important industrial sector in most developed 
countries (Hsu, 2012). Brammer & Pavelin (2006) observe that the median annual value of 
direct cash and in-kind philanthropic contributions (e.g., community involvement) by the 
UK's leading companies is only 0.8% of reported pre-tax earnings. Zimmeck & Pharoah 
(2015) further report that in 2012/13 charitable contributions made by UK insurers was at 
£9.2 million (US$14.2 million) less than one-tenth of that donated by UK banks in the same 
period. The modest contributions to charitable causes observed amongst insurance firms 
support the observation of Muller, Pfarrer & Little (2014) that the criteria that inform board-
level decisions to engage or not engage in philanthropy are not clear from the extant 
literature. These statistics further underscore a fundamental question highlighted by 
researchers such as Moore (2001), Jo & Harjoto (2011), Barnet & Salomon (2012), amongst 
others, and that is: does it pay companies to do good? In the context of the present study, two 
additional questions arise as follows: (a) given their public visibility why are charitable 
donations by insurers as a proportion of earnings so low relative to other sectors? and (b) 
does reinsurance influence the strategic decision of insurers to engage in philanthropy? Our 
observation that reinsurance is a (non-equivalent) substitute for corporate charitable giving in 
UK non-life insurance firms addresses these questions. As insurance is an all-pervasive and 
significant item of discretionary risk management expenditure in the corporate sectors of 
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developed economies that typically exceed annual dividends by a factor of up to 40%  (Lin, 
Lin & Zou, 2012), our results  can, as noted earlier, be extended to other financial and non-
financial sectors that engage in substantial risk hedging, and so have a broader appeal to 
management scholars.  
Second, our research sheds light on another theoretically-motivated question often 
asked by scholars (e.g., Jensen, 2002) and that is: which of a firm's stakeholders matter the 
most? Several studies in the management literature (e.g., Agle, Mitchell & Sonnefield, 1999; 
Kaler, 2003; 2006) highlight the tensions that academics and practitioners face in 
conceptualizing and prioritizing how a firm's scarce resources should be allocated among a 
competing hierarchy of stakeholder claims. However, (re)insurance not only allows 
(insurance) firms to harmonize the competing interests of primary stakeholders with direct 
(explicit) contractual claims on insurance firms (e.g., policyholders, investors and managers), 
but also benefit secondary (normative) groups, such as the wider public, that may have 
overlapping (implicit) moral claims arising from a 'shock' event. This intuition contrasts with 
the study of Godfrey et al. (2009), which finds that 'CSR-as-insurance' primarily benefits 
secondary rather than primary stakeholders, and suggests that compared with financial risk 
mitigation strategies such as (re)insurance, investment in CSR-type activities is of second-
order strategic importance. In this regard, the present study could help inform strategic 
analysis of stakeholder legitimacy (e.g., Suchman, 1995; Phillips, 1997, 2003). The present 
study also addresses a limitation in prior 'CSR-as-insurance' studies (e.g., Godfrey, 2005; 
Godfrey et al., 2009; Koh et al., 2014) that have not explicitly hypothesized and/or controlled 
for the mediating-effect of insurance and other hedging activities on CSR spending. For 
example, if CSR behavior is motivated theoretically by the desire of managers, shareholders, 
and others to mitigate a decline in firm value (Godfrey, 2005), then logically its effectiveness 
in doing so will be influenced by other risk management considerations such as the amount 
of insurance protection in place. This study seeks to shed light on this issue. 
Third, we believe that our study's research design has intrinsic advantages over many 
previous CSR/CSP studies. For example, our focus on the UK’s non-life insurance sector 
inherently controls for possible biases that can arise in cross-industry and cross-country 
studies of CSR (e.g., as a result of different managerial motives and business risk exposures) 
(e.g., see Aguinis & Glavas, 2012)15. Whereas previous 'CSR-as-insurance' studies (e.g., 
Godfrey et al., 2009, 2010; Koh, et al., 2014) are conducted on large and high profile 
exchange traded firms, our sampling frame avoids potential selection bias by including a mix 
of insurers of different size, financial structure, and ownership-type. Pharoah & Walker 
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(2015) argue that such an approach gives a more balanced analysis of the incidence and level 
of charitable giving in firms of diverse size, ownership-type and financial structure. Another 
novel contribution is that by incorporating financial expertise as a moderator in our analysis 
we allow for the effect of professional norms and obligations in ensuring effective 
stakeholder management. This is a managerial incentives aspect of our study that Laplume et 
al. (2008) argue could be important in advancing stakeholder theory-based empirical 
research. Our panel data design also accounts for temporal changes in both the decision to 
donate to charitable causes, and the amount of giving – a control-feature that is often missing 
in prior research (Brammer & Millington, 2008).  
 Furthermore, we consider that our research moves the CSR literature forward in at 
least four key regards. First, our research highlights that (re)insurance (and risk hedging more 
generally) is a more important strategic risk management tool than CSR in protecting 
corporate reputation/brand from shock events. For example, CSR investment per se does not 
effectively protect the full portfolio of constituency interests against the costs/risks of 
financial distress and/or bankruptcy; but indemnification via (re)insurance does. Second, the 
present study suggests that strategic risk management can be likened to an ‘optimization 
solution’ that involves trade-offs between different policy options. In larger insurers, for 
example, this can involve evaluating the relative costs and benefits of CSR activities against 
more conventional risk management mechanisms. In contrast, in smaller insurers CSR 
investment is likely to be disconnected from the strategic risk management process as it does 
not serve the socio-economic and political interests of  stakeholders. Third, we suggest that 
future ‘CSR-as-insurance’ research controls for the mediating-effects of other risk 
management activities of firms in order to improve the robustness of derived conclusions as 
to the risk management effectiveness of strategic CSR investment. Corporate risk hedging 
data could be gleaned from published sources (e.g., annual reports) and/or by using direct 
survey methods. Fourth, as noted in recent CSR research (e.g., El Akremi et al., 2016) future 
'CSR-as-insurance' studies could use direct survey methods to examine perceptions and 
trade-offs at the director micro-level director regarding the motivations behind risk 
management (insurance) and CSR-type strategic decisions. Such studies could usefully 
contribute to the organizational psychology literature on risk management and risk behavior 
in firms operating in different sectors and institutional settings.  
 We acknowledge that the present study has some inherent limitations such as its focus 
on a narrow measure of CSR – direct charitable and altruistic community donations - and 
shortcomings with regard to the availability of data (e.g., the use of dummy variables).  What 
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is more, the robustness of our conclusions with regard to female directors may be biased by 
their generally low presence on the boards of UK non-life insurers during our period of 
analysis. On the other hand, our research design has attributes. For example, the use of 
charitable donations is a common and direct measure of CSR activity. Additionally, we use 
12 years panel of data drawn from a representative sample of UK non-life insurers that helps 
account for changes in corporate giving over time. Our focus on a single country/single 
industry is also advantageous given that such an application mitigates potentially 
confounding cross-industry/trans-national effects (e.g., due to regulatory and fiscal 
variations) and that reinsurance and corporate donations data are readily available in the 
public domain. Finally, the results of our research could stimulate further empirical studies 
on the strategic ‘insurance’ function of CSR engagement in international insurance, and 
indeed, other industrial sectors. 
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NOTES  
                                                          
1 In 2012/13 there were 976 non-life insurance entities licensed to operate in the UK but only about a third of 
these entities actively underwrite insurance business. Non-active insurance operatives include a miscellany of 
structures such as closed funds in run-off, 'brass plate' branches of overseas firms, and protection and indemnity 
pools that do not underwrite third party risks. 
 
2 Koehn & Ueng (2010) report that philanthropy can be a ‘window-dressing’ exercise aimed at distracting 
public media attention away from activities that generate negative externalities on economy and society (e.g., 
environmental pollution). Whilst insurers do not create obvious negative externalities in the same way as say a 
mining company, their business activities can nonetheless have negative socio-economic effects. For example, 
as Baker (2000) reports, discriminatory risk pricing/selection can exclude certain social groups (e.g., the poor) 
from insurance markets. However, the implicit altruistic assumption in our paper holds in insurance because as 
we have noted earlier, insurance is fundamentally a ‘trust and relationship’ business and that non-altruistic 
activities risk being exposed in the public domain with a potentially deleterious impact on an insurer’s public 
reputation for ‘prudence and fair dealing’. 
 
3 A case in point here is Admiral plc which entered the highly competitive UK motor insurance market in 1993 
and became the subject of a board-level management buyout in the late 1990s with the assistance of a 75% 
reinsurance agreement with a syndicate of external reinsurers the most notable being Munich Re. Indeed, from 
its earliest days a representative of Munich Re has sat on the board of Admiral plc. Over the period of analysis, 
Admiral plc was a consistent and above market average cash contributor to charitable causes (e.g., with direct 
cash donations of £141,000 in 2012). Admiral plc’s share of the UK motor insurance market in annual premium 
terms is around 12%, and it is currently the second largest UK motor insurer in terms of the total number of 
vehicles insured. 
 
4 The panel sample of 77 insurance firms arises after trimming for incomplete data. We consider that our use of 
a balanced panel does not raise concerns about survivorship bias as average levels of charitable donations were 
generally low (i.e., about £50,000 per annum per Table 2). As such, philanthropy, and CSR activity more 
generally, are unlikely to be contributory factors behind market exits (e.g., due to insolvency and/or takeover 
activity). Also, there were very few new entrants to the UK’s non-life insurance market during our period of 
analysis (1999 to 2010). A balanced panel design also has the advantage of allowing us to examine charitable 
giving for each insurance firm in every time period examined thus promoting consistency of analysis and 
minimizing ‘noise’ arising from firm-level heterogeneity (Greene, 2003). 
 
5 From 1 April 2013 the statutory supervision and regulation of UK insurance companies is conducted by the 
new Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), whilst matters of insurance market operation are regulated by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The PRA is part of the Bank of England and the FCA is an independent 
regulatory body which is accountable to HM Treasury. 
 
6  At the beginning of our data period the UK non-life insurance industry experienced some corporate 
governance failures notably the demise of Independent Insurance plc in 2001 (Atkins, Fitzsimmons, Parsons, & 
Punter, 2011). As noted earlier, the 2007/8 global financial crisis and the demise of AIG further raised the 
profile of CSR on the strategic agenda of insurance companies both in the UK and internationally (WestLB AG, 
2004). However, we note that the 20078 global financial crisis had no discernible effect on the corporate 
decision to donate to charitable causes (or indeed the purchase of reinsurance). Our observation accords with 
Wu & Shen (2013) who find consistency in CSR activity among international banks in the years immediately 
before and during the 2007/8 global financial crisis. 
 
7 The beneficiaries of UK insurers' charitable contributions over our period of analysis (1999 to 2010) are many 
and varied, and included registered national and international charities as well as local community groups. 
However, the amount donated to particular charitable causes is not always disclosed thereby precluding a 'fine' 
analysis of the purpose of charitable giving.   
 
8 The UK’s Companies Act (2006, sections 382/465) currently makes it a statutory requirement for companies 
(except small companies with annual turnover below £6.5 million and total assets of £3.26 million) to disclose 
annual charitable donations over £2,000. However, the small companies’ exemption does not apply to insurance  
firms under the Financial Markets Services Act (FSMA) (2000).As publicly reported accounting items, 
corporate donations in the UK are subject to external audit certification – a situation that does not exist in many 
other countries, including the United States (US) where charitable contributions are not required to be disclosed 
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in companies’ published annual accounting statements (e.g., see Masulis & Reza, 2015). Statutory disclosure 
requirements for charitable donations in the UK go back further than 2006 to section 234(3) and Schedule 7 
(paragraphs 3 and 4) of the 1985 Companies Act (Adams and Hardwick, 1998). Also, prior to 2006 it was 
established ‘good practice’ (e.g., as advocated by professional accountancy bodies) for UK companies to 
disclose contributions to charitable causes in the annual report and accounts. Therefore, missing data due to 
unreported contributions to charitable causes is unlikely to be problematical in the current UK-based study. 
Additionally, compared with charitable giving, payments to political parties are rare in the UK corporate sector 
(Brammer &Millington, 2003).  
 
9McWilliams & Siegel (2000) report that research and development (R&D) and advertising and promotion 
(A&P) expenditures should be controlled for in CSR research. However, R&D and A&P expenditures were not 
identifiable from our sources of data. In any case, it is likely that such expenditures are, at least to some extent, 
captured by other control variables such as firm size, profitability, and age. 
 
10 We assume that there is a conjoint theoretical linkage between the 'participation' and 'volume' decision. For 
example, all else equal, a large publicly visible insurer is likely to have the resources necessary not only to 
donate but give more generously than a smaller insurer with a less prominent public profile. However, we 
acknowledge that this assumption may not always hold true in practice. For example, a big insurer may be 
willing to donate to charities but may be financially constrained to donate large sums to charitable causes. 
 
11 As a further precaution against potential endogeneity, we followed Masulis & Reza (2015) and estimated our 
regressions using single period lags whereby the independent variables in period t were regressed against the 
charitable donations indicators in period t+1. This had the effect of reducing the total number of firm/year 
observations from 924 to 847. The  results are qualitatively unchanged 
 
12 VIFs are computed as 1(1-R2), where R2 is derived from regressing individual explanatory variables on all 
other explanatory variables (Kennedy, 2003). To further mitigate the risk of multicollinearity and so improve 
the robustness of our results we mean-centered the variables of interest in conducting the multivariate analyses 
(see also note 16). 
 
13 Another reason for excluding BSIZE from the regression analysis is that this variable could be simultaneously 
determined with other board composition variables such as the proportion of outside board members.  
 
14 Multicollinearity can arise between each interaction term (e.g., REINS x OUTS) and its constituent parts (e.g., 
REINS and OUTS). To resolve this issue we use the ‘centering’ transformation procedure of Jaccard, Turrisi & 
Wan (1990), which involves ‘centering’ corresponding continuous variables by subtracting sample means 
before constructing the interaction term. The centered forms of the corresponding constituent variables are then 
used in the probit and tobit estimations to reduce correlations between the multiplicative term and the 
component variables. 
 
15 Aside from possible biases (e.g., different regulatory and fiscal rules) in cross-sectional/trans-national studies 
the main reason for focusing on cash charitable donations in the UK non-life insurance industry is data 
availability. Li & Greenwood (2004) also note that intra-industry studies have advantages for management 
research – for example, as ‘natural control environments’ unimpeded by different institutional-effects.  
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Table 1: UK Non-Life Insurers 1999-2010: Definition of Variables  
VARIABLE REPRESENTS DEFINITION PREDICTION 
Dependent 
variable 
DONit Corporate 
Donations 
Annual corporate donations  
 DDUMit  Corporate 
Donations 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
an insurer has donated in 
time t, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Main 
independent 
variable 
REINSit Annual 
reinsurance 
purchases 
Annual premiums ceded to 
reinsurers / annual gross 
premiums written (including 
reinsurance assumed)  
+/- 
Corporate 
governance 
variables 
BSIZEit Board Size Number of board members + 
 OUTSit Outside (non-
executive) 
directors 
Percentage of outside 
directors to total board 
members 
+ 
 SEPit Separation of the 
CEO and 
Chairman position 
A binary variable of 1 if the 
CEO and Chairman 
functions are separate, and 0 
otherwise 
+ 
 INSIDEit Insider ownership Binary variable equal to 1 if 
an insurer has a managerial 
share ownership scheme, 
and 0 otherwise 
+ 
 COMPit CEO incentive 
compensation 
A binary variable of 1 if the 
CEO receives incentive 
compensation (e.g. bonus or 
stock options), and 0 
otherwise 
+ 
 G-MIXit Gender mix Percentage of female 
directors to total board 
members 
+ 
 PROFit Finance 
professional 
representation 
Percentage of qualified 
finance professionals to total 
board members 
+ 
Firm-specific 
control 
variables 
SIZEit Firm size Total value of assets 
(inflation-adjusted) 
+ 
 
 
OWNit Ownership 
structure 
Percentage of shares held by 
the top-3 shareholders to 
- 
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 total shares in issue. 
 PROFITit Profitability Annual earnings before 
interest & taxes (millions) 
(inflation-adjusted) 
+ 
 LEVit Leverage Percentage of annual 
premiums written to total 
capital (equity + reserves) 
i.e., the premium-to-surplus 
(P-S) ratio 
- 
 P-LINEit Product-Mix A binary variable equal to 1 
for multiple lines insurers, 
and 0 otherwise 
- 
 AGEit Length of time an 
insurer has been 
operating 
Number of years of 
operation. 
+ 
Note: Dummy variables are used where metric data were not available from public sources. 
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Table 2: UK Insurers 1999-2010: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Panel A: Pooled (1999-2010) 
Variable Mean   Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
DON 0.05 0.00 2.15 0.00 2..60 
REINS 0.34 0.31 1.14 0.05 3.05 
BSIZE 7.00 6.00 3.00 3.00 16.00 
OUTS 0.55 0.55 0.12 0.00 0.82 
SEP 0.92 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
INSIDE 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
COMP 0.84 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
G-MIX 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.40 
PROF 0.28 0.25 0.11 0.00 0.88 
SIZE 997 54 3,727 1.8      31,220 
OWN 0.63 0.67 0.29 0.00 1.00 
PROFIT 50.45 2.78 255 -237 2,977 
LEV 1.18 1.11 0.25 0.53 3.85 
P-LINE 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 
AGE 48.40 34.00 33.83 2.00 133 
 
Panel  B: Donators (1999-
2010) 
Variable Mean   Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
DON 0.11 0.08 0.21 0.01 1.60 
REINS 0.29 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.65 
BSIZE 7.80 8.00 2.64 4.00 16.00 
OUTS 0.59 0.60 0.11 0.20 0.82 
SEP 0.94 1.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
INSIDE 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
COMP 0.77 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
G-MIX 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.25 
PROF 0.30 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.88 
SIZE 2,043 109 5,291 2.00 31,220 
OWN 0.56 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
PROFIT 103 15.00 369 -237 2,977 
LEV 1.25 1.16 0.25 0.64 2.83 
P-LINE 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
AGE 55.56 39.00 36.57 2.00 133 
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Panel C: Non-donators 
(1999-2010) 
Variable Mean   Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
DON 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
REINS 0.38 0.31 1.56 0.05 3.05 
BSIZE 5.42 5.00 1.74 3.00 12.00 
OUTS 0.52 0.50 0.12 0.00 0.75 
SEP 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
INSIDE 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
COMP 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
G-MIX 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.40 
PROF 0.27 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.67 
SIZE 99 35 234 10 2,198 
OWN 0.70 0.70 0.23 0.30 1.00 
PROFIT 4.92 1.89 15.97 -50 178 
LEV 1.11 1.08 0.23 0.53 3.85 
P-LINE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AGE 42.25 31.00 29.97 3.00 128 
 
Panel D: Donators v. Non-
Donators 
 
Variable 
Don. 
Mean   
Non-
Donators 
Mean 
t-
/WMWU/Χ2 
statistics 
REINS 0.29 0.38 2.442* 
BSIZE 8 5 16.32**  
OUTS 0.59 0.52 -8.82**  
SEP 0.94 0.90 5.21*  
INSIDE 0.54 0.24 87.48**  
COMP 0.77 0.91 30.70**  
G-MIX 0.04 0.01 -6.21**  
PROF 0.30 0.27 -4.60**  
R(SIZE) .64 .38 -15.83**  
OWN 1.25 1.10 9.12** 
R(PROFIT) .62 .40 -12.95** 
LEV 1.25 1.11 -9.12**  
P-LINE 0.06 0.00 28.68** 
R(AGE) .48 .52 2.45**  
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Note: This table gives the summary statistics for the panel of UK insurers in our sample (924 firm/year cases) 
plus separatehe summary statistics for donating (554 firm/year cases) and non-donating insurance firms (370 
firm/year cases) . Continuous variables are measured in £ millions. We replace SIZE, PROFIT and AGE with 
their rank-transformed equivalents R(SIZE), R(PROFIT) and R(AGE) to address the effects of extreme values. 
Thirty-five insurers did not donate in any year of analysis; four  insurance firms gave in some years but not 
others and 48 firms were consistent in terms of donations (but not necessarily the amount donated) over the 
period of analysis. Ten (mainly small) firms in the data set were mutual forms of organization. The low 
percentage (13%) of mutual insurers in the sample precluded the need to test for organizational form-effects on 
the charitable donation decision. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney U test is used for REINS (as REINS has a skewed distribution) and t-test for all other continuous 
variables. X2 test is used to test the independence between categorical variables (SEP, INSIDE, and COMP) and 
the incidence of donation. In panel B the statistical significance values *,** denote statistical significance at the 
5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tail). 
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Table 3: UK Insurers 1999-2010: Correlation coefficient matrix 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1.DON 1.00                      
2.DDUM 0.94** 1.00                     
3.REINS -0.28* -0.39** 1.00                    
4..BSIZE 0.55** 0.48** -0.23 1.00                   
5.OUTS 0.31** 0.29* -0.04 0.44** 1.00                  
6SEP 0.07 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.12 1.00                 
7.I NSIDE 0.36** 0.31* -0.42** 0.34** 0.04 -0.07 1.00                
8.COMP -0.17 -0.18* -0.18 -0.07 -0.04 0.27 0.18 1.00               
9.G-MIX 0.38** 0.32* 0.02 0.41** 0.23* 0.04 0.09 0.03 1.00              
10.PROF 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.10 -0.18 0.13 1.00             
11..R(SIZE) 0.52** 0.46** -0.14 0.66** 0.27* -0.07 0.22 -0.11 0.42* 0.21 1.00            
12.OWN -0.24* -0.24* 0.09 -0.13 -0.20 -0.36** 0.23 0.09 -0.05 0.06 -0.10 1.00           
13.R(PROFIT) 0.43** 0.39** -0.23 0.51** 0.21 0.08 0.27* -0.14 0.34* 0.08 0.67** -0.08 1.00          
14.LEV -0.45** -0.44** -0.28* 0.41** 0.19 0.18 0.30* 0.10 0.29* 0.08 0.44* 0.04 0.53** 1.00         
15.P-LINE 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.20* 0.22* 1.00        
16.R(AGE) 0.28* 0.08 0.10 0.33* -0.04 0.05 -0.42* -0.18 0.20* 0.00 -0.14 0.09 -0.23* -0.25* 0.03 1.00       
17.REINSxOUTS 0.11 0.10 0.60** 0.22* 0.71*
* 
0.12 -0.24* 0.29* 0.23* 0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.10 0.10 014 0.63** 1.00      
18.REINSxSEP 0.14 0.00 0.90** -0.22* 0.00 0.53** -0.41** 0.10 0.11 0.12 -0.11 -0.22* 0.14 0.30* 0.11 0.90** 0.61** 1.00     
19.REINSxINSIDE 0.30* 0.33* -0.30* 0.34* 0.00 -0.12 0.90** 0.23* 0.12 -0.44** 0.31* 0.23* 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.30* -0.10 0.32* 1.00    
20.REINSxCOMP -0.31* -0.24* 0.62** -0.24* -0.10 0.24* 0.34* 0.62** 0.13 0.14 0.11 -0.31* 0.18 0.31* 0.10 0.62** 0.41** 0.63** 0.11 1.00   
21.REINSxG-MIX 0.40** 0.31* 0.10 0.42** 0.24* 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.91** 0.11 -0.10 0.30* 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.24* 0.12 0.13 0.14 1.00  
22.REINSxPROF 0.10 0.13 0.53** 0.11 0.12 0.13 -0.11 -0.31* 0.31* 0.81** 0.12 0.10 0.12 -0.11 0.11 0.53** 0.42** 0.51** 0.10 0.14 0.10 1.00 
Note: This table gives the correlation coefficient matrix for the panel of UK insurers in our sample (n=924 firm/year cases). Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. We replace SIZE, PROFIT and 
AGE with their rank-transformed equivalents R(SIZE), R(PROFIT) and R(AGE) to address skewness and outlying observations. Correlations are computed using the non-parametric  Spearman rank  
correlation  test. *,.**, denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively (two-tail).
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Table 4: UK Insurers 1999-2010: Estimates and marginal-effects of the random-effects 
probit model 
Panel A: Random-effects probit model estimates 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
R(SIZE) (+) 5.89** 5.90** 16.65** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OWN -1.34 -0.82 -3.73* 
 
(0.31) (0.55) (0.05) 
LEV -0.58 -0.51 -0.91  
 
(0.50) (0.65 (0.70) 
P-LINE 13.67 16.15 10.06 
 
(0.11) (0.97) (0.99) 
R(PROFIT) 1.00 -0.59 -3.88 
 
(0.38) (0.70) (0.18) 
R(AGE) 1.66* 9.39** 17.96** 
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
REINS 
 
-31.58** -23.24* 
  
(0.01) (0.02)  
OUTS 
 
3.78* 6.04** 
  
(0.03) (0.00) 
SEP 
 
1.46 -27.27 
  
(0.16) (0.31) 
INSIDE 
 
4.10** 32.60* 
  
(0.00) (0.02) 
COMP 
 
-3.52** -56.17*  
  
(0.00) (0.02) 
G-MIX 
 
11.80** 17.79* 
  
(0.01) (0.05) 
PROF 
 
-0.31** -9.29* 
  
(0.00) (0.05) 
REINS x OUTS 
  
-365.00 
   
(0.23) 
REINS x SEP 
  
  106.13 
   
(0.25) 
REINS x INSIDE 
  
-49.20* 
   
(0.03) 
REINS x COMP 
  
126.42* 
   
(0.03) 
REINS x G-MIX 
  
-576.71*  
   
(0.05) 
REINS x PROF 
  
75.85 
   
(0.86) 
CONSTANT -4.51** 0.71 57.96* 
  (0.00) (0.84) (0.03) 
Estimated  p            0.91      0.96                        0.99 
Likelihood-ratio test of p=0: 
Χ2 (01)                                                                                                                                                                                      742          627                                571
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(0.00)              ( 0.00)                            (0.00) 
Adjusted 
pseudo-R2        16%                23%                             497% 
No. firms   924                  924                            924 
 
Panel B: Random-effects probit model marginal-effects  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
at 
means 
at 
medians 
at 
means 
at 
medians 
at 
means 
at 
medians 
R(SIZE) 2.35 2.19 1.87 0.19 1.00 0.18 
OWN -0.50 -0.46 -0.26 -0.03 -0.22 -0.04 
LEV 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.01 
P-LINE 5.45 5.09 5.11 0.52 6.04 0.11 
R(PROFIT) 0.40 0.37 -0.19 -0.02 -0.23 -0.04 
R(AGE) 0.66 0.62 2.97 0.30 1.08 0.20 
REINS 
  
-9.99 -1.02 -13.94 -0.56 
OUTS 
  
1.20 0.12 0.36 0.07 
SEP 
  
0.46 0.05 -1.64 -0.30 
INSIDE 
  
1.30 0.13 1.95 0.36 
COMP 
  
-1.12 -0.11 -3.37 -0.62 
G-MIX 
  
3.73 0.38 1.07 30.20 
PROF 
  
-0.98 -0.10 -0.56 -0.10 
REINS x 
OUTS 
    
21.89 0.03 
REINS x SEP 
    
6.36 0.17 
REINS x 
INSIDE 
    
-2.95 -0.54 
REINS x 
COMP 
    
7.58 0.39 
REINS x G-
MIX 
    
-34.58 -0.36 
REINS x 
PROF 
    
4.55 0.84 
Note: This table gives the results of the random-effects probit model (where the dependent dummy variable is 
the decision whether or not to donate to charitable causes - DDUM). We replace SIZE, PROFIT and AGE with 
their rank-transformed equivalents R(SIZE), R(PROFIT) and R(AGE) to address the effects of extreme values. 
BSIZE is excluded due to multicollinearity.  Marginal-effects represent discrete changes from 0 to 1. Values in 
parentheses refer to p-values; *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Significance levels are one-tail where a one-way direction is predicted, and two-tail, otherwise. 
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Table 5: UK Insurers 1999-2010: Estimates and marginal-effects of the tobit model  
Panel A: tobit model estimates 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
R(SIZE) 0.97** 0.47** 0.44** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OWN -0.25** -0.28** -0.24** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEV -0.20** -0.17** -0.16** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
P-LINE 0.06 0.04 0.13** 
 
(0.08) (0.44) (0.00) 
R(PROFIT) 
R(PROFIT) 
0.11** 0.05 0.07** 
 
(0.01) (0.14) (0.05) 
R(AGE) 0.16** 0.27** 0.41**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
REINS 
 
-0.57** -2.33** 
  
(0.00) (0.00) 
OUTS 
 
0.20** 0.19**  
  
(0.00) (0.00) 
SEP 
 
-0.02 -0.11 
  
(0.56) (0.70) 
INSIDE 
 
0.19** 0.14* 
  
(0.00) (0.05) 
COMP 
 
-0.06** -0.16 
  
(0.00) (0.14) 
G-MIX 
 
0.60** 0.69** 
  
(0.00) (0.00) 
PROF 
 
-0.30** -0.19** 
  
(0.00) (0.01) 
REINS x OUTS 
  
0.33  
   
(0.97) 
REINS x SEP 
  
0.40 
   
(0.67) 
REINS x INSIDE 
  
-1.04** 
   
(0.00) 
REINS x COMP 
  
0.32 
   
(0.34) 
REINS x G-MIX 
  
 -0.79 
   
(0.90) 
REINS x PROF 
  
4.17 
   
(0.23) 
λ 0.18** 0.07* 0.07* 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -1.02** -0.49** 0.02 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.95) 
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Adjusted pseudo-R2 52% 68% 76% 
N 427 427 427 
 
Panel B: tobit model marginal-effects 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
at means for 
all 
observations 
at 
means 
for 
don>0 
at means for 
all 
observations 
at means 
for 
don>0 
at means for 
all 
observations 
at means 
for 
don>0 
R(SIZE) 0.06 0.28 0.14 0.10 0.10 01.0 
OWN 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 
LEV 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 
P-LINE 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
R(PROFIT) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.09 
R(AGE) 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 -0.53 -0.548 
REINS 
  
-0.17 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 
OUTS 
  
0.06 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 
SEP 
  
-0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
INSIDE 
  
0.07 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 
COMP 
  
-0.02 0.00 0.16 0.16 
G-MIX 
  
0.18 0.20 -0.04 -0.04 
PROF 
  
-0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 
REINS x OUTS 
    
0.09 0.09 
REINS x SEP 
    
0.24 0.24 
REINS x INSIDE 
    
0.07 0.07 
REINS x COMP 
    
0.18 0.18 
REINS x G-MIX 
    
0.95 0.97 
REINS x PROF 
    
0.10 0.10 
Note: This table gives the results of the tobit model (where the dependent bivariate (dummy) variable is the 
financial amount donated to donate to charitable causes - DON). BSIZE is excluded due to multicollinearity.  
Marginal-effects represent discrete changes from 0 to 1. We replace SIZE, PROFIT and AGE with their rank-
transformed equivalents R(SIZE), R(PROFIT) and R(AGE) to address the effects of extreme values. In panel A, 
λ is the inverse mills ratio. Values in parentheses refer to p-values; *, ** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. Significance levels are one-tail where a one-way direction is predicted, and two-tail, 
otherwise. 
